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Case Comments
Torts: Clarification of Libel Per Se-
Libel Per Quod Distinction
Defendant newspaper published an article which announced
the imminent marriage of the two plaintiffs,1 both of whom were
already happily married and had no intention of marrying each
other. Plaintiffs' claims for libel were dismissed as no special
damages were alleged. Two lower courts reasoned that since the
article did not state that plaintiffs were already married, and
extrinsic facts were needed to reveal the defamatory nature of
the words, no action for libel per se existed. The New York
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a newspaper announce-
ment of an impending marriage between two persons already
married is libel per se and no special damages need be proved,
although the announcement did not state that the persons were
already married. Hinsdale v. Orange County Publications, Inc.,
17 N.Y.2d 284, 270 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1966).
The law of defamation has traditionally consisted of two
distinct torts-libel and slander.2 Although libel has been ac-
tionable without allegation or proof of any special damage,3 for
slander to be actionable, specific pecuniary loss has to be pleaded
and proved in all but a few special circumstances. 4 Little rea-
l. Defendant's daily newspaper contained: '"r. and Mrs. Paul
M. Hinsdale ... have announced the engagement of their son, Robert
W., to Concetta Kay Rieber of 43 Knox Drive, New Windsor ......
2. See PRossEa, TORTS § 107 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
3. Under the common law there were two classes of libel: those
libelous on their face; and those consisting of language which, while
apparently innocent, was capable of communicating a defamatory idea
when certain extrinsic facts were known. This latter class required the
pleading of an innuendo. An innuendo was an explanation, of the mean-
ing to be given to the published words. Both classes required the
pleading of an inducement and a colloquim. An inducement was a
statement of extrinsic facts which made the charge intelligible, while
the colloquim was a fact statement which showed that the language
which was published concerned the plaintiff. It developed that all
libels became actionable without proof of special damages, and it was
settled law that any publication in the form of a libel was actionable if,
in fact, it defamed the plaintiff. This was true whether the words ap-
peared defamatory on their face or whether they caused special dam-
ages. Henn, Libel by Extrinsic Fact, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 14, 18 (1961). See
generally HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 5.9, at 372 (1956); Prosser, Libel
Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839, 842 (1960).
4. The four special circumstances in which the pecuniary loss to
the plaintiff is conclusively presumed are as follows: slanders imputing
major crimes; slanders affecting the plaintiff in.his business, trade, pro-
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son exists for this distinction,5 although it is firmly established
in England 6 and is embodied in the Restatement of Torts.7
A hybrid, libel per quod, began to emerge early in this
century.8 While libel per se continues to be actionable without
proof of special damages, libel per quod-libel which is not ap-
parent on its face, but only with reference to extrinsic facts-is
actionable only if special damages are pleaded and provedY This
outgrowth of the original libel action is observed by the ma-
jority of states,10 notwithstanding the Restatement." The ra-
tionale is that a libel which requires reference to extrinsic facts
fession, or office; those imputing unchastity on the part of a woman;
and those imputing a "loathsome" disease such as syphilis. Prosser,
supra note 3, at 841.
5. Prosser points out that remarkably few courts ever have at-
tempted to explain or justify the rule that all libel is actionable with-
out proof of damage, while most slander is not. See Munafo v. Helfand,
140 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Ward v. Forest Preserve Dist., 13 Ill.
App. 2d 257, 141 N.E.2d 753 (1957); Prosser, supra note 3, at 842.
6. See, e.g., Hough v. London Express Newspaper, Ltd., [1940] 2
K.B. 507 (1938).
7. Compare RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 569-70 (1938):
One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes
matter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the
publication a libel is liable to the other although no special
harm or loss of reputation results therefrom.
Id. § 569.
8. See, e,g., Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 169
Ky. 64, 183 S.W. 269 (1916); Stannard v. Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Mach.
Co., 118 Md. 151, 84 Atl. 335 (1912); Denney v. Northwestern Credit
Ass'n, 55 Wash. 331, 104 Pac. 769 (1909). See generally HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS § 5.9, at 372 (1956) for a discussion of the historical development
of libel per quod.
9. See, e.g., McBride v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 196 F.2d
187 (5th Cir. 1952); S & R Motors, Inc. v. Gowens Motors, Inc., 207
Misc. 890, 139 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1955). Contrast these with the
traditional view of the law of libel under the common law, which held
any publication in the form of a libel was actionable if it defamed the
plaintiff, regardless of whether the words were defamatory on their
face or whether they caused special damages. The existence of damage
to the plaintiff was conclusively assumed from the mere publication of
the libel. See HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 5.9, at 372 (1956); Prosser,
supra note 3, at 842.
10. See, e.g., MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536,
343 P.2d 36 (1959); Karrigan v. Valentine, 184 Kan. 783, 339 P.2d
52 (1959); Walker v. D'Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 129 A.2d 148 (1957). See
generally PROSSER §§ 107, 112; Prosser, supra note 3, at 844. Prosser
states that a pleading of special damages in cases of libel per quod is
now accepted by the overwhelming majority of American courts. How-
ever, several recent decisions have reached results contrary to the
majority rule, perhaps forecasting a departure from the libel per se-
libel per quod distinction. E.g., Hinkle v. Alexander, 417 P.2d 586 (Ore.
1966).
11. PROSSE:R § 107, at 781-82.
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is incomplete in itself. It only becomes defamatory if extrinsic
facts are revealed, and since the extrinsic facts were not pub-
lished and may not be revealed, special damages need be proved. 2
In New York, O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co. 1 3 is regarded
as originating the distinction between libel per se and libel per
quod. That case propounded as the established rule of law that:
(a) A publisher of a libel not defamatory upon its face, and
defamatory by virture of extrinsic facts is liable only for the
pecuniary damage which legally resulted from the publication;
and (b) the facts showing such damage must be fully and spe-
cifically set forth in the complaint.' 4
Although the authority for this statement has been questioned, 5
it has become the "established" law in New York.16 It has been
interpreted as holding that libel per quod exists where the pub-
lished words are in no way defamatory, but become so only by
reference to extrinsic facts. 17 Significantly, the defendant is lia-
ble only for the actual pecuniary damage which results from
the publicatiorL
Although the result of describing a defamation as libel per
12. See PROSSER § 107, at 782. California has codified this view:
A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the neces-
sity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or
other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory
language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the
plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage
as a proximate result thereof.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 45a.
13. 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915).
14. Id. at 358, 108 N.E. at 557.
15. The O'Connell court was in error when it stated that there were
"established rules of law" requiring special damages to support a libel
by extrinsic facts action. No New York case before O'Connell had held
that if the plaintiff pleaded extrinsic facts which made the words action-
able, he must also plead special damages or fail in his action. See SEEL-
MAN, LIBEL AND SLANDER IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK §§ 30-58 (1933);
Note, 27 FoRDHAM L. REV. 405 (1958) (discussion of the precedents
O'Connell relied upon).
16. See, e.g., Golden Buddha, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 182
Misc. 579, 45 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Ross v. MacFadden Publica-
tions Inc., 174 Misc. 1019, 22 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
17. See, e.g., Holt v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 22 App.
Div. 2d 791, 253 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1964); Cardiff v. Brooklyn Eagle, Inc.,
190 Misc. 730, 75 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct. 1947) and cases cited note 16
supra.
18. When special damages must be pleaded and proved the plain-
tiff is required to identify his particular loss with a definiteness which
is not ordinarily required in pleading damages. Loss of reputation is
enough in the defamation case which does not require special damages.
But where special damages are required, it is necessary to show some
pecuniary injury. Injury to reputation alone is not sufficient. See
generally McCoRmTcK, DAMAGES §§ 114, 115 (1935).
19671
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
se or libel per quod is apparent, the initial classification of a
particular statement has confused the New York courts. 9 Much
of the confusion has been engendered by decisions of the Court of
Appeals subsequent to O'Connell. For example, Sydney v. Mc-
Fadden Newspaper Publishing Corp.2 0 held a newspaper article
which recited that the plaintiff was the latest ladylove of Fatty
Arbuckle to be libelous per se. The element of defamation in
this statement was that the plaintiff was happily married, an
extrinsic fact not published in the article. The court stated that
the printing of the name of the plaintiff draws with it all that
she is--"her standing, her position in society, and her relation-
ship in life."21 A strong dissent argued that the article was not
defamatory on its face since some reasons must be stated why
the plaintiff should not be Fatty Arbuckle's latest ladylove.22
It is evident that the Sydney court sought to circumvent the
proof requirements of the O'Connell rule because of the serious-
ness of the accusation. Rather than emphasizing the extrinsic
fact and special damage requirements of libel per quod, the Syd-
ney court characterized a publication as libel per se "if it tends
to expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or
disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-
thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly inter-
course in society."2 3  The effect has been confusion in the New
York law of libel.2 4
19. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 839; Note, 30 FoRDsuv L. REV. 463
(1962); 27 FoRDHAm L. REV. 405 (1958); Note, 13 VAND. L. REV. 730
(1960).
20. 242 N.Y. 208, 151 N.E. 209 (1926).
21. Id. at 213, 151 N.E. at 210.
22. The dissenter would have concurred if the court had taken
judicial notice of the bad reputation of Fatty Arbuckle, since the case
would then be brought under the rule of Gates v. New York Recorder
Co., 155 N.Y. 228, 49 N.E. 769 (1898). In Gates the court held an article
which stated plaintiff had worked in a concert hall on Coney Island
was libelous per se since the concert halls were notorious, and their
emplqyees were generally known to be a disreputable class. Gates
differs from Sydney where the court did not emphasize Fatty Arbuckle's
bad reputation, but rather stated that the plaintiff's status makes the
publication libelous per se. 242 N.Y. at 215, 151 N.E. at 211 (1926).
23. Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp., 242 N.Y.
208, 210, 151 N..E. 209, 210 (1926).
24. Seelman contends that Sydney created an exception to the rule
of the O'Connell case.
That exception is that one's station in life, profession or single
or married status is an inseparable part of one's ego and ac-
companies one into court and is part of the word 'plaintiff' in
a libel case, and is not such an extrinsic fact as requires plead-
ing special damages.
SEELMAN, op. cit. supra note 15, §-56, at 11. See commentary, note 19
supra.
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The so-called "status" exception of Sydney has been used,
at least in the Court of Appeals, to distinguish cases from
O'Connelf.2s However, the tendency in the lower courts has been
to follow O'Connell rather strictly 26 In fact the cases are so
inconsistent that one commentator stated that O'Connell is to-
tally disregarded by the Court of Appeals and followed only
sporadically by the lower courts.2 7
Although the Court of Appeals m Hinsdale could have re-
versed the lower court merely on the basis of Sydney, it appar-
ently yielded to the behests of commentators,28 and attempted to
clarify the distinction between libel per se and per quod. The
tack of the court was not to overrule O'Connell, but to reinter-
pret that decision. After citing numerous New York cases hold-
ing that a fact not stated by a newspaper is admissible to show
the article was libelous per se,29 the court stated that the inter-
pretation given O'Connell in previous lower court cases was er-
roneous. Further, the court stated its decision was not in point
with O'Connell and not inconsistent with Sydney.3 0 The court
felt O'Connell did not involve libel by extrinsic fact at all, but
rather was an attempt by plaintiff to label the words as de-
famatory by giving them an unnatural meaning or innuendo. 31
To say that O'Connell did not involve libel by extrinsic fact
is clearly a misconception. The O'Connell court stated that "no
25. See, e.g., Balabanoff v. Hearst Consol. Publications, 294 N.Y.
351, 62 N.E.2d 599 (1945), Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y.
250, 167 N.E. 432 (1929), Smith v. Smith, 236 N.Y. 581, 142 N.E. 292
(1923) Braun v. Armour & Co., 254 N.Y. 514, 173 N.E. 845 (1930),
clearly exemplifies the position taken by the Court of, Appeals. In this
case an apparently complimentary advertisement published by defend-
ant was labeled as defamatory by the court solely because of extrinsic
facts. The court held the publication which stated the plaintiff stocked
defendant's bacon, was libelous per se. Although the fact that .plaintiff
was a kosher meat dealer was extrinsic to the publication, the court
treated the case as an instance of a libel per se.
26. See, e.g., Stemman v. Di Roberts, 23 App. Div. 2d 693, 257 N.Y.S.
2d 695 (1965), Kuhn v. Veloz, 252 App. Div. 515, 299 N.Y. Supp. 924
(1937), Brodek v. Jones, 212 App. Div. 247, 208 N.Y. Supp. 699 (1925)
27. SEELMAN, op. cit. supra note 15, §§ 46-53.
28. See Henn, supra note 3, at 46;- Pilpel, But Can You Do That?
Publishers' Weekly, July 25, 1966, p. 39; commentary, note - 19 supra.
29. Hinsdale v. Orange County Publications, Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 284,
290, 270 N.Y.S.2d 592, 596 (1966). See Annot., '9 A.L.R.3d 559, 561
(1966)
30. 17 N.Y.2d at 290, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (1966)
31. The Hinsdale court pointed out that the plaintiff in O'Connell
attempted to give a defamatory meaning to the published words by as-
cribing to them an unnatural and unreasonable innuendo, rather- than
to show how the words in their ordinary meaning defamed him. .17
N.Y.2d at 590, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (1966)
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inducement or averment of extrinsic facts is necessary" if the
defamatory matter was actionable per se.32 However, since the
apparent purpose in HinsdaZe was to narrow the holding in
O'Connell as much as possible, it was necessary to emphasize the
"ordinary meaning" aspect of that case. Although it is desirable
to limit O'Connell to this meaning, it appears to be a strained
interpretation of that decision. The O'Connell court clearly
stated that the article "was not in and of itself libelous unless the
language, as a whole, considered in its ordinary meaning, natur-
ally and proximately was so injurious to the plaintiff that the
court will presume ... his reputation has been thereby im-
paired."33
Hinsdale necessarily broadens the definition of libel per se
applied by the lower courts. rt no longer is necessary to speak of
libel by extrinsic fact, as one need not prove special damages
even though extrinsic facts are necessary to reveal the defama-
tory nature of the words. The emphasis is on the type of ex-
trinsic facts that must be introduced. If facts are needed to
show the meaning of the words, or to give the words an innu-
endo not justified by the words themselves, special damages
must be alleged and proved. On the other hand, if the facts
merely show why the words, in their ordinary meaning, are
defamatory of the particular plaintiff, no special damages need
be proved.3
4
Hinsdale reflects an appreciation of two laudable, but con-
flicting ideals-the protection of private individuals and the
latitude necessary to insure freedom of the press. In balancing
the interests in this case, the court has favored the individual
by restricting the instances in which a plaintiff will have the
burdensome, and sometimes impossible task of proving special
damages or pecuniary loss. 3 5 The possibility of a fusion of the
32. O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co., 214 N.Y. 352, 360, 108 N.E.
556, 558 (1915).
33. Id. at 358, 108 N.E. at 557.
34. The court stated that they would "apply the reasonable, com-
monsense idea that a fact not expressed in the newspaper but presum-
ably known to its readers is part of the libel." 17 N.Y.2d at 288, 270
N.Y.S.2d at 596 (1966). Thus, the plaintiff may show by extrinsic
facts that the ordinary meaning of the published words defames him be-
cause of his particular status, and the publication will still be held to
be libelous per se.
35. See McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 18, § 115, at 421. It is
obvious that an attempt to put a definite monetary value on loss of
reputation is often impossible, yet application of the special damages
requirement requires this.
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defamatory torts30 into libel per quod seems ill-fated.
It is difficult to explain the rise of the doctrine of libel per
quod at all. It is just as difficult to explain the historical dif-
ference between libel and slander with regard to the proof of
special damages. Perhaps the best explanation, and that ac-
cepted by Hinsdale, is that printed matter has more permanency
of impact.3 7 Assuming this is the basis for the distinction be-
tween libel and slander, the rationale for the difference between
libel per se and per quod must be found elsewhere.
Perhaps the most important consideration in limiting libel
per se to those cases in which the defamation is apparent is to
prevent abuse of the action of defamation. Not only do abuses
exist through the bringing of petty actions, but a defamation
action, or the threat of it, may also be used as a weapon of
extortion. Also, freedom of the press requires some liberality in
allowing the expression of unflattering views. To prevent such
abuses, the requirement of special damages places a substantial
obstacle in the plaintiff's road to recovery. However, the conse-
quence of this obstacle is that proof of actual damage may be
impossible in cases where it is clear that damage has occurred 38
and the press should be held responsible.
Accepting the proposition that two classes of libel are neces-
sary for the protection of all concerned, the problem remains
36. Prosser, supra note 3, at 855.
37. 17 N.Y.2d at 288, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 595 (1966). Prosser states
that it might be better to distinguish upon the basis of the manner and
extent of the defamation rather than the arbitrary distinction between
oral and written communications. In this day of mass media it is diffi-
cult to say that printed matter has more impact than a statement made
over radio or television which might reach millions of people. Clearly
the spoken word has as much, if not more, potential for defamatory
harm as the written word. Prosser, supra note 3, at 853.
38. See, e.g., Cardiff v. Brooklyn Eagle, Inc., 190 MAisc. 730, 75 N.Y.S.
2d 222 (Sup. Ct. 1947), where the defendant printed a false obituary
notice which stated that plaintiff was lying in state at a certain ad-
dress-the address of plaintiff's bar. The court reasoned that the pub-
lication was not libelous upon its face since a person reading the notice
would not know that the address given was a bar. Since extrinsic facts
were necessary to show the libelous nature of the notice, the court con-
cluded that special damages had to be pleaded and proved. Because
they were not, plaintiff's complaint was dismissed. This case exempli-
fies the obstacle that proof of actual damages raises to valid claims.
Here, the plaintiff was obviously defamed since the people who knew
him would very likely know that the address given was that of his bar.
Thus, the very people the plaintiff valued the most-his friends and
acquaintances-were the ones who knew the true meaning of the ap-
parently innocent obituary notice. The plaintiff was defamed to his
friends, but was denied a legal remedy.
1967]
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where to draw the line. The Hinsdale solution seems particu-
larly responsive to the interests involved. Realizing that sub-
stantial harm can be done by printed matter even if extrinsic
facts are needed to uncover the defamatory result, the court
dispenses with the extrinsic fact requirement as a distinguishing
characteristic between the two classes of libel. Instead, the court
emphasizes the probability of harm from the words. In applying
the Hinsdale test, words will be given their ordinary meaning.
If their ordinary meaning reveals no defamation, a plaintiff will
have to prove that such words implied another meaning, and as
evidence of this implication, must prove that he was damaged.
If words, in their ordinary meaning, impute no defamatory char-
acter unless the status of the plaintiff is known, then damage is
to be presumed since the plaintiff's reputation is damaged among
those who are aware of his status.
Consequently, the import of Hinsdale is twofold. It has
cleared the long muddled distinction between libel per se and
libel per quod. Since New York was one of the first states to
observe this distinction,3 9 the law of other states will gain clarity
from this decision. More important, Hinsdale has provided a
new and meaningful distinction between libel per se and per
quod. It is submitted that this distinction will do much to make
the entire law of defamation more responsive to the interests
involved.40
Unfair Competition: Injunctive Relief and
the Personal Name Exception
Plaintiff, a New York art dealer, sued to enjoin his brother's
use of the family name of "Findlay" in the operation of an art
gallery.1 A divided New York Court of Appeals upheld issuance
of an injunction, holding that, even in the absence of bad faith,
one has no right to the trade name use of his own name if the
result is exploitation of another's good will. David B. Findlay,
Inc., v. Findlay, 18 N.Y.2d -, 271 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1966).
39. Henn states that New York was one of the "pioneers" in pro-
moting the libel by extrinsic fact rule. Henn, supra note 3, at 16.
40. See ELEm G, TORTS 529 (1957); WnFIED, TORT 577-83 (7th ed.
1963); Carpenter, Libel Per Se in California and Some Other States, 17
So. CALIF. L. REWv 347 (1943); Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Pro-
posals for Reform, 33 MNN. L. REv. 609 (1949).
1. David B. Findlay, Inc. v. Findlay, 47 Misc. 2d 649, 650, 262
N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
[Vol. 51:775
CASE COMMENTS
Unfair competition as a cause of action evolved from the
willingness of courts to consider the good will of a business as a
property right entitled to protection. 2  While trade symbols
which are fanciful, unique, or nondescriptive are given statutory
trademark protection,3 other trade symbols-those descriptive of
articles or containing personal or geographical names-must com-
ply with certain requirements before statutory or common law
protection will be afforded.4 To establish a cause of action for
unfair competition, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that his
trade symbol has acquired a secondary meaning.5 Secondary
meaning arises if in addition to a word's ordinary meaning it
has acquired further significance as a consequence of the pub-
lic's association of the term with a particular trade affiliation.6
Once secondary meaning has been established, the test of in-
fringement is whether the defendant's use of the word cre-
ated,7 or probably will create,8 public confusion as to the trade
2. 3 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE NAMES § 85.2 (a),
at 1679 (2d ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as CALLMANN]. The present con-
cept of unfair competition encompasses statutory trademark law and
judicial protection of trade names. See, e.g., Maas & Waldstein Co. v.
American Paint Corp., 178 F. Supp. 498, 500-01 (D. Minn. 1959).
3. Trade-Marks Act, 60 Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1963).
See also 3 CALLMANx § 66.1.
4. Statutory protection will be afforded these trade symbols once
secondary meaning is established. See Trade-Marks Act, 60 Stat. 428
(1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1963).
5. It also must be shown that the trade symbol had actually been
used and that it had no previously established meaning in general use.
See, e.g., Howards Clothes, Inc. v. Howard Clothes Corp., 236 Minn. 291,
297, 52 N.W.2d 753, 758 (1952).
6. In Buffalo Yellow Cab Co. v. Baureis, 132 Misc. 654, 230 N.Y.
Supp. 343 (Sup. Ct. 1928), the court indicated that while generally
words with primary meanings are public juris, when they acquire a
trade significance through business usage, all use by others which con-
veys such trade significance will be restrained as unfair competition.
Id. at 656-57, 230 N.Y. Supp. at 346-47.
7. Harvey Mach. Co. v. Harvey Aluminum Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 1078,
1081, 175 N.Y.S.2d 288, 292 (Sup. Ct. 1957). The confusion necessary is
that which would cause an "ordinary purchaser" to buy one product in
the belief he was buying the other. See Fidelity Bond & Mortgage Co. v.
Fidelity Mortgage Co., 12 F.2d 582, 585 (6th Cir. 1926). Although such
confusion is most likely if parties are in direct competition, it has been
found when the parties deal in related products. See, e.g., Cook Chem.
Co. v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 185 F.2d 365, 367-68 (8th Cir. 1950);
Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany's Prods., Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y. Supp. 459
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y. Supp. 821 (1932), aff'd,
262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933). In Tiffany, a motion picture company
was enjoined from using a name which had become famous in jewel
retailing, on grounds that the public might think that the two enter-
prises were connected.
8. See, e.g., American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d
19671
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affiliation of a particular product. If infringement is found, the
defendant will be enjoined or required to respond in damages.
This general rule protecting a businessman's use of a descrip-
tive word or personal name as a trade symbol has sometimes
been limited when a person, in good faith, uses his personal
name in his business.9 Such junior users have been either im-
mune from suit 0 or ordered to make certain modifications in
the use of their names." Thus the New York Court of Appeals,
in Meneely v. Meneely,'2 allowed the defendant to use his own
name in business, regardless of the effects upon the businesss of
others with the same name, as long as he acted in good faith.
The rationale of this "sacred right" doctrine 13 was that the right
of a person to use his own name in business was a natural right
of personality, which was not to be limited by the possibility of
harm to another's business. 4 Consequently, without clear proof
of a defendant's bad faith, a senior user of a trade name was not
protected from appropriation of that name by one whose family
name was the same or similar. 5
619, 624 (5th Cir. 1963); MacSweeney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, 235
Cal. App. 2d 549, 562, 45 Cal. Rptr. 546, 555 (C.A. 1965). See also 3
CALLMANN § 82.3 (a), (b).
9. Meneely v. Meneely, 62 N.Y. 427, 432 (1875). See generally 1
Nims, UNFAm Co Er=oN AD TRADE-MAmKS ch. VI (4th ed. 1947)
[hereinafter cited as Nims].
10. See, e.g., Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 547 (1891).
11. The use of "explanatory phrase" relief has been a favored at-
tempt by the courts to reconcile competing interests. A typical injunc-
tion would require the defendant to modify the manner in which he
used the disputed name. However, the effectiveness of this relief is
highly speculative:
The efficacy of such prefixes [explanatory phrases] obviously
is affected by psychological considerations, a surer understand-
ing of which is much to be desired .... [S]urely a reading of
the long and widespread litigation that has grown out of such
names as "Baker" and "Rogers" leads one to question the ef-
ficacy of such limitations. And, obviously, halfway limitations
inadequate to prevent confusion, propagate litigation, devastat-
ing uncertainty in business, and a cynical reaction to the ad-
ministration of law...
Hat Corp. of America v. D. L. Davis Corp., 4 F. Supp. 613, 622 (D. Conn.
1933). See Thompson v. Montgomery, [1891] A.C. 217, 225, criticizing
explanatory phrases, noting that "thirsty folk want beer, not explana-
tions."
12. 62 N.Y. 427 (1875). See, e.g., Thompson Lumber Co. v. Thomp-
son Yards, Inc., 144 Minn. 298, 301, 175 N.W. 550, 551 (1919).
13. 3 CALLMAN § 83.3 (a) (2), at 1609.
14. Chas. S. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N.Y. 462, 468, 39
N.E. 490, 492 (1895); 1 Nims § 10, at 67.
15. See H-at Corp. of America v. D. L. Davis Corp., 4 F. Supp.
613, 620-21 (D. Conn. 1933), for comment upon the inadequacy of relief
offered in the past. See, e.g., Baker v. Sanders, 97 Fed. 948 (E.D. Pa.
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Although many courts still require bad faith as a prerequi-
site to equitable relief,16 grave doubts concerning the vitality of
this limitation have arisen. Several recent decisions have taken
the position,17 later espoused by the Revised Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act,'8 that bad faith is not a prerequisite to such
relief. Illustrative of this change in judicial attitude is the evo-
lution of the law of New York. After one unsuccessful attempt to
liberalize the Meneely rule,' 9 the appellate division in Sulli-
van v. Ed Sullivan Radio & T.V., Inc.20 ignored the issue of bad
faith, and followed what it believed to be a trend by enjoining
trade name use of an individual's own name, if it "tends or
threatens to induce confusion in the public mind ....
The Findlay court, in accepting the Sullivan court's view
that even the trade name use of one's own family name should
be enjoined when public deception is threatened, stated that the
subjective intent of the defendant was no longer relevant. The
court would only concern itself with the objective question of
whether there was a resultant injury to plaintiff's business.22 By
implicitly recognizing the existence of secondary meaning,23 the
court must have been aware of both the public interest in being
1899); Walter Baker & Co. v. Baker, 77 Fed. 181, 184 (W.D. Va. 1896).
See generally 1 Nnis §§ 70-72.
16. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Crane Heating & Air Conditioning Co.,
299 F.2d 577, 578 (6th Cir. 1962) (Ohio law); Charles J. Donnelley, Inc.
v. Donnelly Bros., 198 A.2d 41, 43 (R.I. 1964).
17. MacSweeny Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, 235 Cal. App. 2d 549,
45 Cal. Rptr. 546 (C.A. 1965); King's of Boise, Inc. v. M. H. King Co., 88
Idaho 267, 398 P.2d 942 (1965); Mayo Clinic v. Mayo's Drug and Cos-
metic, Inc., 262 Minn. 101, 113 N.W.2d 852 (1962); David B. Findlay, Inc.
v. Findlay, 18 N.Y.2d -, 271 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1966).
18. REVISED UNIFORm DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (approved
July 30-Aug. 5, 1966), enacted in Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois
and Oklahoma.
19. World's Dispensary Medical Ass'n v. Pierce, 203 N.Y. 419, 96
N.E. 738 (1911). The court stated that a junior user may not "through
unfairness, artifice, misrepresentation or fraud injure the business of
another or induce the public to believe his product is the product of that
other... ." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 424, 96 N.E. at 740. The court thus
appeared to add the standard of "unfairness" to the Meneely rule. The
potentialities of World's Dispensary, however, were not realized. See,
e.g., Lucile, Ltd. v. Schrier, 191 App. Div. 567, 569, 181 N.Y. Supp. 694
695 (1920).
20. 1 App. Div. 2d 609, 152 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1956).
21. Id. at 611, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
22. 271 N.Y.S.2d 652, 656.
23. The Findlay court did not explicitly state that plaintiff's name
had acquired a secondary meaning, but it is plain that the court used
that concept. The court also applied the confusion test of unfair com-
petition, which is commonly used to determine whether there has been
infringement of a name with secondary meaning.
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able to easily identify both the product and its producer, and a
businessman's interest in protecting his good will. Clearly these
interests are complementary; if there is no public confusion,
there will be no damage to good will.
2 4
New York has not been alone in restricting the deference
paid to the "sacred right" theory. For example, in Mayo Clinic
v. Mayo's Drug and Cosmetic, Inc.,25 the Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed an injunction prohibiting use of the personal
name "Mayo" in the operation of the defendant's drug packaging
and distributing company. The court reasoned that even with-
out fraudulent intent:
a person cannot unfairly use the trade name of another
whereby an ordinary purchaser has been or is reasonably
likely to be deceived as to the true identity of the goods, serv-
ices, or business, to the detriment of the plaintiff or the public
.26
The desirability of this result must be measured in terms of
the competing interests involved: the junior user's interest in
the trade use of his own name; the senior user's interest in pro-
tecting his investment; the consumer's interest in receiving what
he intended to purchase; and society's interest in protecting the
free enterprise system.
The notion that a junior user's trade use of his personal
name is an inherent right of personality2 7 is outmoded. As has
been argued:
In an age when by corporate activity, mass production, and
national distribution, the truly personal element has been so
largely squeezed out of business, there is naturally less legiti-
mate pecuniary value in a family name. Any other name is as
valuable and as available for all legitimate purposes. Formerly,
before the age of advertising, when good will in business was
24. 271 N.Y.S.2d 652, 656-57. The Findlay court did not seem to
consider directly the public's interest in not being deceived; it only con-
sidered public confusion as a means of determining the extent of plain-
tiff's interest. For a consideration of a secondary meaning and public
interest, see generally Stern & Hoffman, Public Injury and the Public
Interest: Secondary Meaning in the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 935 (1962).
25. 262 Minn. 101, 113 N.W.2d 852 (1962).
26. Id. at 107-08, 113 N.W.2d at 853. See Howards Clothes, Inc.
v. Howard Clothes Corp., 236 Minn. 291, 297, 52 N.W.2d 753, 758 (1952).
Decisions in other jurisdictions have reached similar results. See Mac-
Sweeny Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, 235 Cal. App. 2d 549, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 546 (C.A. 1965); King's of Boise, Inc. v. M. H. King Co., 88 Idaho
267, 398 P.2d 942 (1965), wherein the court held that "where the first
user seeks only injunctive relief, such user is not required to establish
fraudulent intent. .. ." Id. at 274, 398 P.2d at 945.
27. Chas. S. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N.Y. 462, 468, 39
NE. 490, 492 (1895).
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slowly developed from personal contacts, the situation may
have been otherwise. 28
Thus, when a personal name is used as a trade symbol, it should
now be evaluated in economic terms rather than as an expres-
sion of personality.
Perhaps the strongest interest is that of the senior user in
protecting his trade symbol from confusion. An entrepreneur
who develops a new product can profit from his efforts only by
developing a market, which requires creation of a continuing con-
sumer interest in his product. Thus, an innovator must first
inform the public of the existence and merits of his product
through advertising. Once consumers have tried his product and
have been satisfied with its performance, he must continue his
efforts to build consumer interest and good will. Often an in-
tegral factor in this market building process is development of a
well-known trade symbol. However, to the extent that there is
trade symbol confusion, an innovator's attempts to build a
market for his product are defeated. It is only equitable to pro-
tect the senior user's investment.
29
Misappropriation of trade symbols also thwarts consumer in-
terest in receiving what was intended to be purchased. 30 In re-
cent years, the public's interest in having trade names which are
not confusing has probably increased because of the increase in
the number of products on the market. When confusing trade
28. Hat Corp. of America v. D. L. Davis Corp., 4 F. Supp. 613, 623
(D. Conn. 1933).
29. Society also has an interest in protecting this investment in
good will. The incentive to innovate and improve products might be
dampened if a businessman is not assured that the good will enhanced
by such activities will accrue to him. Compare the policy behind the
granting of patents and copyrights under U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. In
Kindall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322 (1858); the Court stated that:
[Tihe benefit to the public or community at large was another
and doubtless the primary object in granting and securing that
monopoly. This was at once the equivalent given by the public
for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of
individuals, and the incentive to further efforts for the same im-
portant objects .
Id. at 328. See also Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 (1832);
Miller v. Hayman, 18 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 848, 46 F.2d 188 (1931).
30. The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966), and
Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 76 Stat. 780
(1962), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (Supp. 1966) are examples of statutes pro-
tecting such interest. Mayo Clinic v. Mayo's Drug and Cosmetic, Inc.,
262 Minn. 101, 113 N.W.2d 852 (1962), provides an example of an instance
where the possible harm to the public could be great. Consumers might
well have relied upon the name "Mayo" in purchasing drugs whose
quality had no relationship to the medical and research facilities of the
Mayo Clinic. Id. at 107, 113 N.W.2d at 856.
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names exist, consumers have difficulty distinguishing between
goods. Thus, because of the expansion of mass production and
consequent large scale consumer identification with trade names,
it would seem that society's need to prevent confusion of trade
symbols should transcend the personal interests of individual
competing businessmen.3 1
Finally, society has an interest fi protecting the system of
free enterprise. Under this system an efficient allocation of eco-
nomic resources requires that consumption accurately reflect
demand. Thus, if two products which can be used for the same
purpose differ in quality, and consumer preference is for the one
of higher quality, resources are allocated efficiently if used to
produce the preferred product. If through confusion of trade
symbols consumers are led to purchase the product of lesser
quality, consumer purchasing does not reflect quality and the
economy has no valid feedback by which resources can be allo-
cated efficiently.
In abolishing the requirement that bad faith be shown be-
fore a jumor user's utilization of his own name will be enjoined,
Findlay and kindred decisions have more realistically weighed
the competing interests. As a result, these courts have placed
less importance upon a junior user's interest in using his name
as a -trade symbol. Rather, the emphasis has switched to the
consumer's and society's interests which complement the semor
user's interest in receiving a full return on his investments in
good will, advertising, and innovation.82  Thus, in the future,
courts will undoubtedly be more responsive to prayers for in-
junctive relief against infringing trade use of personal names,
even in the absence of bad faith.33
.31. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946). See gener-
ally DOLE, Tmuo~aiAL TRADEMARK RiGHTS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
(1965)
"32. See generally Stern & Hoffman, .supra note 24.
33. Hopefully, more liberal use will be made of absolute injunc-
tions against use of personal names to provide effective protection
'where explanatory phrases can not. Such relief, limited to the area
in which confusion is likely, could make evasion of the spirit of the
injunction difficult. Also, 'by barring completely the use of a trade
-symbol confusingly similar to plaintiff's, other persons having names
deceptively similar to senior users, will be discouraged from an attempt
-to "pass off" their products as those of senior users. See Hat Corp. of
America v. D. L. Davis Corp., 4 F Supp. 613, 623 (D; Conn. 1933);
Comment, 40 CALIr. L. REV. 571, 583 (1953).
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